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A SECOND LOOK AT CLEARING FIRM LIABILITY*
INTRODUCTION
Within the securities industry, the notion of clearing
firm1 liability is an anathema.2 Nevertheless, "[t]he role of
[a] clearing broker [ ] is about to change[!]"3 In March 1998,
©2001 Daphna Abrams. All Rights Reserved.
1 Serving a vital role within the securities industry, clearing firms provide
necessary services and capital typically needed by small brokerage houses to complete
a securities transaction. "Clearing" involves delivering securities to the purchasing
broker-dealer and making money payments to the seller broker-dealer. Clearing
services include: maintaining the books and records of customer accounts, sending
confirmations and monthly statements to customers, and clearing and executing
trades. NORIN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION § 2.04[B] (3d ed.
2000); see infra Part II discussing the role and responsibilities of clearing firms.
2 Some commentators have suggested that claims against clearing firms
typically arise as a result of unsuccessful claims against introducing firms. Usually,
suits against introducing firms are unsuccessful because the introducing firm is
insolvent or investor funds have already been absconded, thereby affording no
adequate remedy for the investor. In those circumstances where the introducing firm
cannot provide an adequate remedy, the clearing firm is an investor's only avenue for
vindicating his or her claims. Ultimately, the financial burden will fall on either the
investor or clearing firm. As a practical matter, the introducing firm is often out of the
picture. See Comment, The 'Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of
Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities Laws, 2 DUKE L.J. 489, 493-94
(1973) [hereinafter 'Wnow Your Customer']. Thus, "[b]ecause clearing firms are
relatively well capitalized, they become 'deep [ ] pockee litigation targets "Henry
F. Minnerop, The Role and Regulation of Clearing Brokers, 48 BuS. LAW. 841 (1993).
3 Philip M. Aidikoff et al., Clearing Firm Liability: A Forward Looking
Analysis, 1062 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES [hereinafter PLI/CORP.] 113, 136 (1998) C'the trend is clear; turning
a blind eye to securities violations will not be tolerated"). Cf. Michael G. Shannon,
Clearing Firm Liability-Has the Dam Really Cracked?, 1196 PLI/CORP 677, 681
(2000).
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former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") Arthur Levitt forewarned that future SEC proposals
may require clearing firms to oversee the activities of the
introducing firm with whom they contract and even terminate
those relationships where the introducing firm is engaging in
fraudulent practices. 4 Then, in 1999, the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") amended their rules requiring clearing firms
to more closely momtor the acts of introducing firms with
whom they contract. As a result, clearing firms may no longer
maintain "complete immumty from liability" 5 for investor
losses.
Until recently, the regulation of clearing firms by the
SEC, NYSE, NASD, and other regulatory agencies has been
sparse. Such agencies have been reluctant to enact stricter
regulations (which may impose liability when not properly
carried out) because of the vital financial and admnnstrative
roles that clearing firms serve within the securities industry
The combination of a pro-business regulatory environment and
the strong bargaining power of the clearing firm explains the
reluctance of regulatory agencies to assign liability 6 Part I of
this Note defines the clearing function and discusses the
important role that clearing firms play within the securities
industry
When it comes to settling disputes between customers
and their introducing broker-dealers, clearing firms have
traditionally asserted an independent status. In fact, clearing
firms such as Bear Stearns Securities Corp. ("Bear Stearns")
have emphatically claimed "complete immunity" from any
responsibility to entertain or investigate complaints, or to
settle disputes involving the alleged fraudulent practices of an
4Paul Beckett, Levitt Wants SEC & Justice Agency to Work Together Against
Bad Brokers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1998, at A3.
5 POSER, supra note 1, at § 2.04[B].
6 Clearing services are performed by small number of firms. In 1993, there
existed a ratio of approximately one clearing firm for every five introducing firms. See
Aidikoff et al., supra note 3, at 117; Gerald B. Kline & Raymond L. Moss, Liability of
Clearing Firms; Traditional and Developing Perspectives, 1062 PLI/CORP. 139, 144
(1998) (Recent industry statistics reflect that approximately one hundred twenty
NYSE clearing firms serve the needs of more than four thousand introducing
brokers."); Minnerop, supra note 2.
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introducing firm.7 This claim of immunity stems primarily
from the contractual allocation of responsibilities and
corresponding liabilities within the clearing/carrying
agreement8 and the lack of a fiduciary relationship between the
clearing firms and the customer/investor. Part II of this Note
outlines the legal frameworks for establishing clearing firm
liability and reviews the traditional view of clearing firm
liability for claims arising under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.9
A recent shift in the attitude of the courts and self-
regulatory orgamzations ("SROs") such as the NYSE and the
NASD indicate that clearing firms do retain some
responsibilities when performing clearing' functions for the
introducing firm and the customer/investor. In July of 1999,
the SEC approved amendments to NYSE Rule 382 and NASD
Rule 3230 which govern carrying agreements." The purpose of
these amendments is to allocate certain regulatory
responsibilities between the clearing firm and the introducing
firm. Although limited, these new regulatory responsibilities
may evolve into new claims and theories of liability against a
clearing firm. 12 New rules may give the courts the statutory
flexibility needed to establish liability for a clearing firm's
involvement in fraud originating at the introducing firm.
Nevertheless, the extent of involvement required to establish
liability remains unclear. Part II-D of this Note discusses the
role self-regulatory orgamzations play in establishing liability
7 Introducing firms, typically small brokerages winch lack sufficient capital,
technology, and personnel to self clear, enter into relationships with clearing firms to
outsource clearing services. See infra Part ]I for description of clearing services.
8 A carrying or clearing agreement is a contract between a clearing firm and
introducing firm. Within the carrying agreement, the clearing firm agrees to perform
certain enumerated services on behalf of the introducing firm and the investor. See
discussion infra Part IL
9 Pub L. No. 107-48, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq.)
[hereinafter Securities Exchange Act].
1O See supra note 1 and discussion infra Part II.
i1 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 to Proposed Rule Change to
Amend its Rule 382 Relating to Carrying Agreements, Exchange Act Release No.
41,469, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,338 (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter NYSE 1999 Amendments].
12 See Kline & Moss, supra note 6, at 156.
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and explains recent amendments to SRO rules governing the
clearing relationship.
In the wake of the August 1999 settlement between
Bear Stearns and the SEC, the responsibility and
corresponding liability of clearing firms are being questioned
anew 13 The settlement was precipitated by New York County
District Attorney Morgenthau's successful prosecution of the
introducing firm A.R. Baron & Co. ("Baron") and thirteen of its
employees for securities fraud involving over $75 million of
investor funds.14 The SEC stated in a press release that Bear
Stearns caused and aided and abetted securities fraud
violations as well as violated Commission rules governing the
clearing process. 15 Part III of this Note discusses the August
1999 settlement between the SEC and Bear Stearns.
With the emergence of renewed interest in clearing firm
liability, some commentators have speculated that clearing
firms will be held responsible for "policing trading activities"
16
at the introducing firm, a role they are not willing to or capable
of undertaking. As the title of one New York Times article asks,
"Should a clearing firm be its broker's keeper"1 7 Opponents of
increased responsibility on the part of a clearing firm claim
that imposing stricter standards will increase a clearing firm's
exposure to risk, resulting in an increase in the cost of services
or even a clearing firm's decision not to perform clearing
services at all.' 8 According to this view, a proposal aimed at
increasing clearing firm liability may have a negative economic
13 Cf. Shannon, supra note 3, at 701 (suggesting that the effect of the Bear
Stearns settlement on the future success of claims against clearing firms are minimal
since there is no adjudicated result and since the facts were extremely unique).
14 Bear Stearns Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 7,718, 70
SEC Doc. 537 (Aug. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Bear Stearns Settlement]; Bear Stearns
Securities Corporation to Pay $35 Million to Settle SEC Charges that it Caused Fraud
at AR. Baron; Bear Stearns President Harriton Charged with Fraud, at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/99-94.txt (last visited Aug. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Bear
Press Release].
15 Bear Press Release, supra note 13, at 3.
16 Diana B. Henriques, New Accusation in Investigation of Bear Stearns, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1997, at D1.
17 Diana B. Henriques & Peter Truell, Should a Clearinghouse Be Its Broker's
Keeper?; Queries for Bear Stearns After a Firm Fails?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at
Di.
18 See generally William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, An Analysis of
the Business and Legal Relationship Between Introducing and Carrying Brokers, 40
BUS. LAW. 47 (1984); Minnerop, supra note 2.
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effect on Wall Street. Of course, advocates of stricter regulatory
standards claim to hold the public interest in mind-with the
ultimate goal of curbing securities fraud and ensuring the
integrity of the securities market.
In general, this Note examines whether a clearing firm
shall be held liable as a primary violator or an aider or abettor
under Section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for
violations in connection with its actions pursuant to the
clearing agreement. This Note examines questions that are at
the heart of the issue of liability, namely- (1) whether a
clearing firm has knowledge of fraud occurring at the
introducing firm; (2) whether the clearing firm assists or
partizcpates in the fraud, and to what extent; and (3) whether a
fiduciary relationship exists between the customer and the
clearing firm. These limiting factors are the primary bar
against investor relief for securities fraud Violations.
This Note does not claim that clearing firms should be
per se liable for the fraudulent acts of the introducing firms for
whom they clear; nor does this Note claim that clearing firms
should be per se immune from liability based on legal
precedents which are outdated and inappropriate to the
present situation. Instead, regulators and the courts must
strive to find a middle ground that is equitable and efficient,
and that preserves the economic and social commumty for all
parties involved. Certainly, a clearing firm is held liable for
causing or directly participating in securities violations with
the introducing firm. Liability may also be imposed for certain
involvement-including failure to investigate or reverse
questionable trades, non-disclosure of fraudulent activity
occurring at the introducing firm, and even failure to terminate
contractual relations with fraudulent introducing brokers-
which perpetuate securities violations originating at the
introducing firm. In Part IV this Note proposes new theories of
liability, even in the absence of regulatory change, that would
hold clearing firms liable for these acts. In this section, the
following traditional legal assumptions concermng clearing
firm liability are questioned: (1) that "clearing" is an
administrative function which is routine and neutral; (2) that
the clearing firm's knowledge of the fraud does not taint the
clearing function; and (3) that the clearing firm owes no
fiduciary duty to the investor.
20011]
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I. THE ROLE OF THE CLEARING FIRM
At the center of the securities industry, clearing firms
provide the necessary services and capital typically needed by
small brokerage houses to complete a securities transaction,
most importantly, the clearing function. 19 For regulatory, as
well as for technical reasons, clearing is capital intensive and
requires significant technology as well as large numbers of
personnel. Small brokerage firms, commonly referred to as
"introducing firms," typically lack sufficient capital, back office
technology and personnel 2° to "self-clear."21 As a result, they
enter into "carrying agreements" with clearing firms to
outsource clearing and other services. By contracting with
clearing firms, introducing firms save considerable "costs
associated with the initiation and maintenance of' these
services. 22 Even firms that have sufficient capital to self-clear
find it more efficient to outsource clearing services. 23
A clearing firm clears trades, i.e., completes
transactions by delivering securities to the purchasing broker-
dealer and by making money payments to the selling broker-
dealer.24  Clearing responsibilities include: "receiving or
delivering funds from or to the customer; maintaining records
that reflect the transaction; and safeguarding the funds in the
customer's account."25 A clearing firm is also responsible for
mamtaimng records of all trades made by the customer,
including sending confirmations, monthly statements, and
dividends to the customer/investor. 26  The courts have
traditionally characterized these services as administrative, in
that the clearing firm performs purely ministerial or "back
office" functions. 27
19 See tnfra Part II, discussing the role of clearing firms.
2 0 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 842.
21 See infra Part II for a brief description of "clearing."
22 Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 17, at 48.
23 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 843 ('Clearmg arrangements are classic
examples of divisions of labor.").24 Id.
25 Id. at 842.
26 Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18; Minnerop, supra note 2.
27 See Flickinger v. Brown & Co., 947 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1991); Connolly
v. Havens, 763 F Supp. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Dillon v. Militano, 731 F Supp. 634
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Antinoph v. Laverell Reynolds Sec., Inc., 703 F Supp. 1185 (E.D. Pa
[Vol. 67" 2
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Additional clearing services include the extension of
credit for the purchase of securities on margin.28 In a typical
clearing arrangement, the clearing firm loans money to the
introducing firm which is collateralized by securities owned by
the introducing firm. If the value of the collateral falls below
the mnimum required, the clearing firm will issue a margin
call-a demand to put additional money into the margin
account to meet the minimum margin level. 29 In this capacity,
the clearing firm acts as creditor to both the customer and the
introducing firm.30 It does so by committing to pay for customer
trades, advancing the funds for those trades when the
customer or introducing firm is delinquent, and then financing
trades on margin.3 1 In its role as creditor, the clearing firm
maintains daily records of the investor's accounts on margin
including: the name and amount of shares of each stock held,
its current selling price, the total market value, the equity on
deposit, and the account's credit balance.32
In addition to performing clearing functions, on
occasion, the clearing firm executes transactions, thereby
limiting the role of the introducing broker to simply soliciting
investor sales.3 3 The clearing firm also provides name
recognition for the introducing firm, frequently inflating the
image of a small, unknown introducing firm. The name Bear
Stearns, for example, lends credibility, stability, business
savvy, and expertise to unknown introducing firms.34
1989); Ross v. Bolton, 639 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
28 Minnerop, supra note 2.
29 KENNETH K. MORRIS & ALAN M. SIEGAL, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MONEY & INVESTING (1993).
30 In the Matter of Symbollon Corp., Wells Submission of Bear Sterns
Securities Corp., 3 (Oct. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Wells Submission] (on file with author).31Id.
32 Id.
33 Minnerop, supra note 2.
34 See Gretchen Morgenson, Sleazy Doings on Wall Street, FORBES, Feb
24, 1997, at 114. Such association leads many customers to believe that the clearing
firm and introducing firm are intimately affiliated. In an effort to reduce this
association, many cleanng firms are not named by their parent, but are known under a
different name.
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The carrying agreement is a contract in winch the
cleanng/carrying firm agrees to perform clearing services on
behalf of the introducing firm and its clients.35 Generally, the
clearing firm agrees to perform certain enumerated services for
the introducing firm according to the introducing firm's needs
wich, in turn, are based on the introducing firm's size and
capitalization. 36
Within the clearing agreement, the introducing firm
accepts "all sales practice and related compliance
responsibilities."37 According to the clearing department of
Bear Stearns, the acceptance of these responsibilities
eliminates any reason for the clearing firm to contact or
communicate with the customer.38 The customer agreement
mandates that the clearing firm accepts all sales transactions
from the introducing firm "wthout mnquiry or investigatwn,"39
and that it "will have no responsibility or liability [to the
customer] for any acts or omissions of the [introducing firm],
its officers, employees or agents."40 Thus, when confronted with
customer complaints of unauthorized trading by the
introducing firm, in addition to refusing to reverse the trade,
the clearing firm defers all customer correspondence to the
introducing firm.41 It is the introducing firm's sole
responsibility to maintain customer accounts.42  The
35 Although the investor is typically not a party to the contract, the
carrying agreement is binding on the customer. Wells Submission, supra note 30, at 7.
36 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 843; Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18. Two
types of carrying agreements exist: fully disclosed agreements and omnibus
agreements. As the name suggests, a fully disclosed agreement discloses to the
carrying firm the identity of the introducing firm's customers and any relevant account
information. In contrast, an omnibus agreement discloses only the name of the
introducing firm with whom the carrying firm maintains an account. Notwithstanding
the type of agreement, the customer deals solely with the introducing firm. Fitzpatrick
& Carman, supra note 18.
37 Wells Submission, supra note 30 (citing to the clearing agreement).
38 Id. at 6.
3 9 Id. at 5 (quoting from the customer agreement).4 0 Id.
41 Note that the 1997 amendments involving the handling of customer
complaints speak to this. With NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230, clearing firms
are required to acknowledge to the customer, to the introducing firm, and to the proper
self regulatory organizations, the receipt of all customer complaints.
42 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 843. By shifting all liability to the introducing
firm, the clearing agent eliminates the need for customer contact. See discussion infra
Part II. As such, it may be unreasonable to propose that clearing firms be held liable
for investor losses due to inappropriate investment advice. "Knowing your customer" is
[Vol. 67: 2
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contractual allocation of responsibilities within the carrying
agreement has been looked to by the courts to decide liability
issues.43
Although primarily a matter of contract between the
parties, that allocation of responsibilities is also governed by
rules promulgated by self-regulatory orgamzations. 44
Specifically, the 1982 amendments-to NYSE Rules 382 and
405 and NASD Rule 3220-allow both parties to agree on their
respective functions and responsibilities as long as they are
disclosed within the carrying agreement.45  Additionally,
"[u]nder [amended NYSE] Rule 382, all Rule 405 type
responsibilities (e.g. "know your customer" rule) may be
allocated exclusively to introducing firms." 46
To the advantage of clearing firms, both the clearing
and customer agreements have created substantial roadblocks
for establishing liability Additionally, the customer agreement
also stipulates that a clearing firm may act on behalf of the
the sole domain of the introducing firm.
43 See Schwartz v. Bear Stearns & Co., 1998 WL 672708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug.
24, 1998) (The introducing firm may "accept orders [from the introducing firm] 'without
any inquiry or investigation' and without any 'responsibility or liability to [plaintiff] for
any acts or omissions of [the introducing firm].' See also POSER, supra note 1, at 81.
44 As a matter of contract between the parties, the (contractual) allocation of
responsibilities may be altered through rules promulgated by the self regulatory
orgamzations. Two attempts at altering the responsibilities were made in 1982 and
again in 1997.
45 New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change,
Exchange Release No. 18,497, 47 Fed. Reg. 8284 (Feb. 19, 1982) [hereinafter NYSE
Amends Rule 382]. NYSE Rule 382: "All clearing and carrying agreements shall
specify the respective functions and responsibilities of each part to the agreement and
shall, at a mnimum, specify the responsibility of each party with respect to each of the
following matters." Except in regard to the handling of customer complaints, specific
responsibilities are not relegated to either party under NYSE Rule 382. Under NYSE
Rule 382, the clearing agreement must specify the party responsible for the following:
(1) the opening, approving, and monitoring of accounts; (2) the
extension of credit; (3) the maintenance of books and records; (4) the
receipt and delivery of funds and securities; (5) the safeguarding of
funds and securities; (6) the [sending of customer] confirmations and
statements; and (7) the acceptance of orders and transactions.
Id., See also Self-Regulatory Org., Nael Assoc. of Securities Dealers, Inc., Order
Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change Concerning the Imposition of Substantive
and Procedural Requirements on Members Entering Into Clearing Agreements,
Exchange Release No. 33,517, 59 Fed. Reg. 4297 (Jan. 24, 1994) [hereinafter NASD
Amends Clearing Rules].
46 NYSE 1999 Amendments, supra note 11; see also Minnerop, supra note 2,
at 849.
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introducing firm, but safeguards against any liability to the
investor.
II. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF A CLEARING FIRM'S
LIABILITY
Private actors may bring claims for violations under the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), state common law claims for
fraud and for breach of fiduciary duty, and for violations of the
rules of self-regulatory orgamzations. Traditionally, courts
have accepted four possible liability theories: primary,
controlling person, aiding and abetting, and contractual
liability But most claims have arisen under liability either as
a primary violator or as an aider and abettor. Between these
two theories, the courts have been more sympathetic to claims
for aiding and abetting in as much as the theory does not
require the clearing firm to have actual control over the actions
of the introducing firm.47 However, in the landmark case of
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the
Supreme Court precluded private plaintiffs from bringing an
action for aiding and abetting a Rule 10b-5 violation.48 By
restricting aiding and abetting liability claims, the Central
Bank decision requires private plaintiffs to allege that the
clearing firm is a primary violator, a more stringent standard
to prove than secondary liability Nevertheless, all secondary
liability has not been eliminated by Central Bank.49 Aiding and
4 7 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 852.
48 511 U.S. 164 (1994). By restricting aiding and abetting liability claims by
investors, the effects of the Central Bank decision will be increased attempts to expand
the scope of primary liability. See In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F Supp. 569, 583
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter Blech II]. The courts have approached these attempts with
caution. POSER, supra note 1, at § 6.02, 6-27; see Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Holmes, 76
F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant is neither liable under aiding and
abetting nor primary liability). Indeed, the effect of Central Bank is that it may be
harder to find clearing firms liable.
49 See POSER, supra note 1, at § 6.02, 6-28; "Know Your Customer,"supra note
2, at 492; see also § 21(f) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (1995); SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1282-84 (9th Cir.
1996). See also Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank's
Textualist Approach-Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1 (1997).
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abetting claims may still be brought under SEC enforcement
actions.
Primary liability under Rule 10b-5 is imposed for
misstatements, omissions, and fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 50 To find a
viable primary liability claim, the plaintiff must allege that the
clearing firm "intentionally or recklessly misrepresented or
failed to disclose a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."51 For liability based on an
omission, the clearing firm must show that it owed a direct
duty to the customer and that tlus duty was breached.52 There
is also a scienter requirement; any omission,
misrepresentation, or fraudulent scheme must be made with
an "actual intent to deceive."53
Secondary liability claims for aiding and abetting
require the claimant to allege: (1) a primary violation by
someone other than the aider and abettor; (2) substantial
knowledge of the violation (scienter); and (3) substantial
assistance of the violation by the aider and/or abettor.
54
Therefore, a clearing firm's knowledgeable assistance or
participation in the fraudulent acts of the introducing firm may
give rise to aider and abettor liability 55 Non-disclosure,
however, may not be a basis for secondary liability unless there
is an independent duty to disclose on the part of the clearing
firm.
The issue of clearing firm liability is a paradox. In order
to prove primary liability based on an omission, it must be
shown that the clearing firm has a fiduciary relationship to the
investor. However, by shifting (in the carrying contract) all
authority to the introducing firm, the clearing agent eliminates
the need for customer contact.56 Then, as a matter of law,
absent direct commumcations between the investor and the
clearing firm, no fiduciary relationship is established. And
absent a fiduciary relationship, a clearing firm that performs
50 Securities Exchange Act § 10b.
5 1 Antinoph, 703 F Supp. at 1187.
52 Id. at 1187-88.
53 Connolly, 763 F Supp. at 11.
54 Id.
5 5 Faturik v. Woodmere Sec. Inc., 442 F Supp. 943, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
56 Wells Submsston, supra note 30.
2001]
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
clearing services does not have a duty to investigate or disclose
possible fraud at the introducing firm. In order to prove
secondary liability, it must be shown that the clearing firm,
with knowledge, substantially assisted in securities violations
which originated at the introducing firm. However, the mere
performance of clearing services does not constitute direct
participation or substantial assistance.
The following subsections will explore in detail these
possible barriers to liability- (1) the lack of a fiduciary
relationship between the investor and the clearing firm; 57 (2)
insufficient knowledge or insight into fraud occurring at the
introducing firm by the clearing firm; and (3) the classification
of services performed by the clearing firm as routine and
admimstrative. This section will also discuss liability theories
under the rules of self-regulatory orgamzations.
A. Fiduciary Duties
The lack of a fiduciary relationship between the clearing
firm and the customer has been a boilerplate defense against
all primary and most secondary liability claims.5 8 Absent a
fiduciary duty to the investor, mere knowledge of the fraud,
without actual participation, is not actionable against the
clearing firm,59 and the clearing firm has no duty to disclose, or
even investigate, suspicions of fraud occurring at the
introducing firm. Therefore, unless the parties are in a
fiduciary relationship, silence is not actionable. A duty to
disclose arises only "when there is a fiduciary relationship or
some relationship of confidence or trust.''60
A fiduciary has the "duty to act for the benefit of
another."61 The fiduciary duty serves as an accountability
mechamsm over persons who are in control of actions that
5 7 See POSER, supra note 1.
58 Id.
59 '"Iere bystanders, even if aware of the fraud, cannot be held liable for
inaction since they do not associate themselves with the venture or participate m it
as something they wish to bring about." Antinoph, 703 F Supp. at 1187.60 Id.
61 Flickinger v. Harold Brown & Co., 947 F.2d 595, 599 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing
Mandelblatt v. Devon Stores, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 162, 168, 521 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (ist
Dep't 1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. a (1977)).
[Vol. 67- 2
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benefit another.62 Moreover, fiduciary duties are pertinent to
any liability scheme for omissions or rnaction since the law is
reluctant to impose liability for non-disclosure without a
special duty to act. Underlying the necessity of a fiduciary
relationship is the rationale that "[m]ere bystanders, even if
aware of the fraud, cannot be held liable for inaction since they
do not associate themselves with the venture or participate
in it as something they wish to bring about."63
Fiduciary duties arse from agency relationships. 64
"Agency is a legal relation created by contract, whereby one
party, called the agent, is authorized to represent the other
party, called the principal, in business dealings with third
persons, and is usually empowered to bring the principal into
contractual relations with such persons."65 Essential to an
agency relationship is the element of control; "there can be no
agency relataonship where the alleged principal holds no right
of control over the [alleged] agent."66 An agency relationship
may result from the "manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf "67 Even if
the parties do not intend to create an agency relationship
within the contract, it may be implied. However, mere trust
and confidence in another may not, in itself, create a fiduciary
duty 68 The relationship must be consensual; the other party
must accept, either implicitly or explicitly, the responsibilities
associated with being a fiduciary
An agency relationship exists between the introducing
firm and the clearing firm as well as between the introducing
firm and the investor. A clearing firm is an agent of an
introducing firm but not vice versa; the introducing firm is not
the agent of the clearing firm because the clearing broker acts
on behalf of the introducing broker, which has control over the
6 2 J. C. SHEPARD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 97 (1981).
6 3 Antinoph, 703 F Supp. at 1187. (citing Intl Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980)).6 4 Fitzpatnck & Carman, supra note 18, at 53. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957) [heremafter RESTATEMENT].
65 Sternaman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, 62 N.E. 763 (1902). See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, at § 1.
66 See Kyung Sup Ahn v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 624 F Supp. 368, 370 (1985)
(construing Mazart v. State, 109 Misc.2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. C1. 1981)).6 7 Fitzpatnck & Carman, supra note 18, at 53.
68 Id. at 63.
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actions of the clearing firm.69 Under the clearing agreement,
the introducing firm consents to and retains all control over the
acts that the clearing broker performs on its behalf. In
exchange, the clearing firm accepts all orders and instructions
from the introducing firm "without inquiry or investigation."70
If the introducing firm directs the clearing firm to "buy," the clearing
firm buys. If the introducing broker directs the clearing firm to
"sell," the clearing firm sells. If the clearing broker clears a
purchase, it agrees to pay the counterparty to the transaction no
matter what anybody says about the trade.
7 1
In order for the "[clearing] system to work," states Bear
Stearns, clearing firms must blindly accept the orders of the
introducing firm.72
Under the standard customer agreement, the
introducing firm is the investor's agent.73 As an agent, the
introducing firm buys and sells securities for its customers on a
commission basis. By virtue of the authorities outlined in the
customer agreement, the customer grants the introducing
broker ultimate power to act on its behalf, who then grants the
clearing broker ultimate power to act on its behalf.74
As agents, it is undisputed that introducing brokers owe
special fiduciary duties to their customers. 75 At a minimum, it
is the introducing broker who is responsible for providing
investors with genuine investment advice and determining the
suitability of investments. As a result, the introducing firm has
certain-disclosure obligations in addition to obligations of due
care and loyalty 76 These responsibilities remain exclusive to
69 See Katz v. Fin. Clearing Serv. Corp., 794 F Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that an introducing firm is not an agent of the clearing broker.); Kyung
Sup Ahn, 624 F Supp. at 370 (no agency relationship existed because clearing firm
held no right of control over introducing broker); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18.
70 Wells Submission, supra note 30, at 5.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Antinoph v. Lavarell Reynolds Sec., Inc., 703 F Supp. 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
76 According to the majority rule, a cause of action under the federal securities
laws is not created unless the fiduciary violation is accompanied by fraud. Richard A.
Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to Measure
Risk, 54 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1602 (1999). See also Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. 410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir. 1969).
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the introducing broker and are not deemed to be the
responsibility of the clearing firm. That these obligations
belong to the introducing firm is reinforced by NYSE Rule
405-the "know your customer" rule - requiring the introducing
firm to use due diligence when opening and maintaining all
customer accounts. 77  Absent a familiarization and
acquaintance with the customer, the introducing firm has no
ability to offer suitable advice.
In contrast, no court has found that the clearing firm is
a fiduciary to the investor.78 Underlying the courts' reasoning
is the lack of an agency relationship between the clearing firm
and the investor. The standard rebuttal heralds that the
clearing firm's performance of routine "bookkeeping functions"
does not create any "duty to investors whose contact and
relationship was solely with the introducing broker."79 Clearing
firms also argue that no trust relation exists with the customer
because the clearing firm's responsibilities are contractually
linted to bookkeeping and other administrative duties.80
Additionally, the clearing firm is relieved of the suitability
obligations under the "know your customer" rule.81 In sum, the
courts have concluded that the clearing firms' contracted for
responsibilities are wholly independent of the investor.
77 NYSE Rule 405.
78 Carlson v. Bear Stearns & Co., 906 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1990) (clearing firm
not liable for "aiding" or "participating" in introducing firm's sale of unregistered
securities under Illinois Security Statute); In re Alder Coleman Clearing Corp., 198
B.R. 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (clearing broker not agent of introducing broker and
owes no fiduciary duty to introducing broker's customers); Connolly, 763 F Supp. at
10-11 (clearing broker owes no fiduciary duty to client and not liable for aiding or
abetting introductory broker's fraud by providing normal services); Faturik, 442 F.
Supp. at 946 (clearing broker liable for churning customer account under NYSE "know
your customer" rule); Mars v. Wedbush Morgan Sec., Inc., 283 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Cal Ct.
App. 1991) (clearing broker owed customer no other duty then that it undertook to
perform as clearing broker); Stuart A. Smith Corp. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., No. 86-95-S (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 1986) (Paine Webber acting as clearing broker had
no duty to investigate suitability of transactions directed by investment adviser);
Denson v. Bear Stearns Sec. Corp., 682 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1996) (clearing broker duties
are mnstenal-not liable for actions of introducing broker or its agents), Riggs v.
Schappel, 939 F. Supp. 321 (D.N.J. 1996) (clearing broker owes no duty to supervise
introducing broker and is not liable under agency or negligence theory).
79 Dillon, 731 F Supp. at 639.
80 Wells Submissin, supra note 30, at 3.
81 NYSE Rule 405; See also Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18; Minnerop,
supra note 2.
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B. Scienter
A second required element of both prmary and
secondary liability claims is scienter-knowing or intentional
conduct. Absent a fiduciary duty between the clearing firm and
the investor, the scienter requirement is heightened; it must be
shown that the clearing broker acted with actual knowledge of
the fraud or an intent to deceive.8 2 Thus, the claim that the
clearing firm should have known of the fraud is not sufficient.8 3
Because of this extremely high standard, many Rule 10b-5
claims are dismissed in their preliminary stages for failure to
state a claim. If the clearing firm stands as a fiduciary to the
investor, then a recklessness standard is sufficient to
constitute scienter.8 4 Recklessness is the "extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care to the extent that the
danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that
the defendant must have been aware of it."8 5
The courts have held that a clearing broker, acting
solely in its clearing capacity, may not have actual knowledge
82 Connolly, 763 F Supp. at 10.
83 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court changed the law holding
that an actual intent to deceive is a required element of a 10b-5 case. 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976). See Connolly, 763 F Supp. at 9 (rejecting the claim that "in the exercise of
reasonable diligence," the clearing broker should have known of fraud at the
introducing firm); Stander v. Fin. Clearing & Serv. Corp., 730 F Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (dismissing aiding and abetting claim against clearing firm for reckless
disregard of possible fraudulent activity at the introducing firm). In early liability
cases prior to Ernst & Ernst, constructive knowledge was held to satisfy the scienter
requirement of Rule 10b-5. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.); SEC v. First Sec. Corp., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972). In
Buttrey, it was found that the clearing broker should have known about illegal trading
activities at the introducing firm because of his obligations under the "know your
customer" rule, Rule 405 of the NYSE. In First Securities, the court held that "liability
predicated on aiding and abetting may be founded on less than actual knowledge "
of the illegal activity. 463 F.2d at 987 (emphasis added). Thus, these early cases
demonstrate that if the activity of the primary violator is so "egregious or reckless,"
knowledge of the violation will be imputed on the clearing broker. 'Know Your
Customer," supra note 2, at 533. Therefore, under earlier case law, the scienter
requirement was satisfied when the clearing firm had either actual knowledge of the
fraud or was so reckless that knowledge was deemed imputed.
84 Ross v. Bolton, 639 F Supp. 323, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
85 Id. (citing the definition first announced in Sundstrand Corp. v Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977).
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of any illegal activities occurring at the introducing firm. 86 In
other words, "clearing" alone does not provide the clearing firm
with the necessary insight to reveal fraud at the introducing
firm. Additional factors are necessary in order to prove
scienter. For example, when the introducing and clearing firms
enjoy a "close working relationship," it may be found that the
clearing firm had sufficient knowledge of the underlying fraud
to sustain a clain for aiding and abetting.87 In the seminal case
of In re Blech Securittes88 ("Blech II), the plaintiff established
that the clearing firm, Bear Stearns, had actual knowledge of
the fraud because of: (1) daily contact with high ranking
officers at the introducing firm; (2) an "intimate knowledge" of
the securities held by the introducing firm and the "value and
liquidity of those securities", (3) "information from daily
analysis of key accounts" held by the introducing firm; and
(4) past knowledge of sham trading at the introducing firm.89
Under these facts, the plaintiffs alleged that Bear Stearns
displayed an intent to deceive.
Many investors, albeit unsuccessfully, have claimed
that certain clearing activities go beyond administrative and
that a clearing firm may detect an "overall pattern" of
securities violations through the performance of these
activities.90 Through its clearing responsibilities, including
8r See Connolly, 763 F. Supp. at 9 (acting as clearing broker for the
introducing firm does not establish that the clearing broker "knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known" about illegal activities at the introducing
firm) (citing the complaint, p. 164.). See Stander, 730 F. Supp. at 1286 (alleging that
clearing firm, through its "clearing activities," knew or should have known of
fraudulent activity by the introducing firm.).
87 Faturik, 442 F. Supp. at 945 (holding that clearing firm had
sufficient knowledge of underlying fraud where clearing firm had offices in the same
building and on the same floor as the introducing firm).
88 961 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
89 Id. at 583.
90 Aidikoff et al., supra note 3, at 132; Antinoph v. Laverell Sec., Inc., 703 F
Supp. 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Microcap stocks are low priced stocks issued by the
smallest of compames. See http://www.sec.gov/consumer/microbro.htm. Microcap
companies are typically thinly capitalized and maintain minimal filing requirements
with the SEC. Within the Microcap securities industry, fraud is more prevalent since a
small number of brokers control the market and public information is limited. See
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/microcap.htm. Fraud within the microcap securities
industry usually involves a scheme called 'pump and dump." Using high pressure
sales tactics, customers are solicited to buy certain "preferred" stock in which the
brokerage firm makes a market. As the "preferred" stock is promoted or "pumped" and
market prices rise, company insiders sell stock realizing substantial profits at the
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momtoring margin accounts and executing trades, customers
have alleged that a clearing firm may identify "no net sale"
policies, market price mampulation, undisclosed mark-ups, and
excessive commissions,91 all of which are violations of the
securities laws. Most courts, however, have rejected these
claims.
In Ross v. Bolton, the plaintiff alleged that the clearing
firm, by clearing transactions on margin, aided and abetted a
market mampulation promulgated by the introducing firm.92
Plaintiff claimed that the clearing firm "cancelled a number of
trades in which [the introducing firm] was purchasing
securities but continued to execute transactions in which [the
introducing firm] was the seller."9 3 Tis tactic allegedly
reduced the amount of money owed to the clearing firm, while
increasing the amount of investor debt. Therefore, by holding a
margin account, the plaintiff alleged that "Bear Stearns must
have scrutimzed the account more closely than it otherwise
would have,"94 and therefore knew that fraud was occurring at
the introducing firm. The court held that when executing
trades on margin, the clearing firm did not have actual or
constructive knowledge of the fraud when it cleared a large
number of transactions in a particular security and the price of
that security was steadily rising, or when trades were
selectively executed in order to reduce the amount owed.95
Many investors have also brought claims alleging that
the clearing firm should have known that trading done in their
accounts was perpetuated by fraud. However, most courts have
rejected these theories under the rationale that the customer's
broker is the introducing firm and that no fiduciary relation
exists between the clearing firm and the investor. In Stander v.
expense of public investors. Once large blocks of shares are sold, stock prices usually
drop dramatically, leaving investors empty pocketed. As part of the "pump and dump"
scheme, brokerage firms employ the following fraudulent business practices: "no net
sales" policies, unauthorized trades, churning of accounts, and using "bait and switch"
tactics. Under a "no net sale" policy, sales of stock are not permitted unless it is
accompanied by a "crossing order-an order from another customer to purchase the
same position." Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14.
91 Aidikoffet al., supra note 3, at 132.
92 Ross, 639 F Supp. at 325.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 327.
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Financial Clearing & Services Corp. ("FiCS"), petitioners
alleged that the clearing firm knew or should have known of
fraudulent activity by the introducing firm through its clearing
activities.96 The court dismissed plaintiffs claim that NYSE
Rule 405 imposed a fiduciary duty upon FiCS since the clearing
agreement shifts any and all trading responsibilities to the
introducing broker.97 Indeed, clearing brokers (such as Bear
Stearns) claim that due to the sheer volume of trades and their
limited contact with customers, a clearing firm is not capable of
overseeing the appropriateness of the investments and the
trades that they clear. Finally, even if trades are risky or are
inappropriate for a specific investor, the clearing firm, within
the customer agreement, has full authority to accept trades
from the introducing firm, limiting any affirmative duty to
question the trades ordered. The Stander court held that even
if trades made in a customer's account are "risky" or occur
despite "unsatisfied margin calls," this is not sufficient to
establish that the clearing firm had actual knowledge of
fraudulent activity since all trading is done pursuant to a
standard option agreement,98  clearly authorizing the
introducing firm to act as the customer's agent and to trade on
the customer's account.9 9 Within that context, all investment
decisions are solely between the customer and the introducing
firm and all investment advice and supervision of trading rests
solely with the introducing firm. Unless FiCS "knew [the
trading] authorization to be fraudulent or improper," the
clearing broker could not be found to have actual knowledge of
fraudulent trading in its customers' accounts. 100
These decisions suggest two things. First, the courts do
not distinguish between a clearing firm's responsibilities when
clearing trades on margin and those responsibilities required
for traditional trading. Or, even if the responsibilities that
evolve from each vary, neither meets the high threshold of the
96 Stander, 730 F Supp. at 1286.
9 7 Id. at 1287.
98 Prior to the initiation of any trading on the customer's account, he or she is
required to sign a standard option agreement with the introducing firm and a customer
agreement with the clearing firm. Both the standard option agreement and the
customer agreement establish the legal relationships among the parties involved.
Antinoph, 703 F. Supp. at 1186.
99 Stander, 730 F Supp. at 1286.
iOO Id. at 1287.
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scienter requirement. In other words, even when executing
trades on margin, the clearing firm may not gain greater
Insight into possible fraud by the introducing firm than when
clearing traditional trades. Second, even if fraud is at the heart
of the matter, the clearing firm will accept and process all
trades ordered by the introducing firm, no matter how risky
Note that this reasoning seems to indicate that a clearing firm
may look away (because of the authority granted to the
clearing firm in the customer agreement, there is no reason to
investigate), but it does not disprove that clearing may not
provide insight into fraud at the introducing firm. A clearing
firm may have knowledge of the fraud, but, as discussed above,
the contractual arrangements among the parties allow the
clearing firm to escape liability And a "clearing broker cannot
be held liable simply because it performed its contracted-for
services." 1 1 Viewed in a broader context, what appears to be
intentional may not be.
C. Direct Partizcpation and Substantial Assistance
Under both primary and secondary claims, liability
ultimately turns on the clearing firm's involvement in the
fraud and the extent of that involvement. Liability will not
attach unless the clearing firm participated in the fraud
(directly or indirectly), even if it is shown that the clearing firm
knew or should have known of fraud occurring at the
introducing firm. 102 Under primary liability, it is alleged that
the clearing firm participates directly in the fraud by either
performing routine clearing services with knowledge of fraud,
failing to disclose to the investor fraudulent behavior by the
introducing firm, or even failing to prevent the fraud from
continuing.1 3 To find liability under aiding and abetting
liability, the clearing firm must "substantially participate"'1 4 in
the fraud. Substantial participation is also alleged through the
101 Id. at 1288.
10 2 Blech II, 961 F Supp. at 584.
10 3 Antinoph, 703 F Supp. at 1187; See Minnerop, supra note 2, at 851.
104 See Minnerop, supra note 2.
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routine performance of clearing services with knowledge of
fraud and non-disclosure of material facts. 0 5
A clear definition of what constitutes participation by
the clearing firm does not emerge from the case law Instead,
courts have consistently and adamantly concluded what does
not constitute participation: under either liability theory, the
performance of routine clearing constitutes neither direct
participation nor substantial assistance, even in the face of
knowledge of fraudulent activity 106 Thus, the "act of clearing
sham trades is not equivalent to causing or directing sham
trades."'1 7 Also, the courts do not distinguish between clearing
trades on margin and traditional clearing; both do not
constitute direct or substantial participation in the fraud by
the clearing firm. 0 8
Absent a fiduciary relationship, any liability based on
an omission will not qualify as direct participation or
substantial assistance. 109 Even if the clearing firm has actual
or constructive knowledge of the fraud, "awareness and
approval, standing alone" will not create liability 110 In other
words, mere knowledge of the fraud, absent actual
participation, is not actionable against a clearing firm who is
not in a fiduciary relationship to the investor. A clearing firm
may be liable for inaction "only where there is a conscious or
reckless violation of an independent duty to act.""' Therefore,
except in limited circumstances, the clearing firm has no duty
105 Id.
106 Connolly, 763 F Supp. at 10 (stating that routine performance of
clearing services does not constitute substantial assistance).
107 Blech II, 961 F. Supp. at 584.
108 In Stander, the court held that "continuing to execute and record trades in
[plaintiffs] account despite [plaintiffs] failure to meet margin calls" does not constitute
substantial assistance. 730 F. Supp. at 1287.
109 Connolly, 763 F Supp. at 11.
ilo Ross, 639 F. Supp. at 327 (citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 92
(2d Cir. 1983)).
Ill Stander, 703 F. Supp. at 1287 (citing IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d
Cir. 1980)); see Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir. 1969) (failing to use due diligence over customer accounts pursuant to NYSE Rule
405 constituted inactivity for wlhch the clearing firm was held liable as an aider or
abettor). Buttrey, however, is the minority view. See infra note 121. Moreover, the
responsibilities under NYSE Rule 405 have been shifted from the clearing firm to the
introducing firm.
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to disclose or investigate possible fraud at the introducing firm
under either primary or secondary liability 112
In Stander, the court held that the only duty between
the clearing firm and the customer under the clearing
agreement was to "report on the activity of the [customer's]
account." 118 The complaint alleged that FiCS substantially
assisted in the fraud "by continuing to execute and record
trades in Stander's account despite Stander's failure to meet
margin calls, and despite FiCS' alleged knowledge of Stander's
imtial conservative investment goals."114 The court held that to
the extent the responsibilities of the parties are outlined in the
carrying agreement, and the introducing firm was "acting
under [the] actual authority" of the investor, and the clearing
firm fulfilled its single duty of reporting account activity to the
customer, the clearing firm had no duty to disclose or
investigate risky trades. 115 The Stander court stated the
following to support its decision not to impose liability-
It would be an unfortunate stretch of liability to hold that a clearing
broker, whose only prvity-created obligation to an investor is a
reporting one, must undertake the obligation of insuring that the
investor, who has signed customer agreements outlining the broker's
responsibilities, fully understand the reports provided, and that the
investor acts on them in the most prudent manner. Such would be
taking paternalism to an extreme. 116
In the case of Blech 11,117 a federal district court in the
Second Circuit was the first court to decide what acts may
expose a clearing firm to liability The court held that a
clearing firm may be held primarily liable only when it
"directly and knowingly participate[s]" in the fraud.118
112 Stander, 730 F Supp. at 1286-87.
113 Id. at 1287.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 961 F Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The initial complaint was denied with
leave to amend. In re Blech Sec. Litig., 928 F Supp. 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter
Blech 1]. In Blech I, the court granted Bear Stearns' motion to dismiss even though the
clearing firm "knew but failed to disclose" information pertaining to fraudulent conduct
by the introducing firm because "as a matter of law, a clearing broker owes no duty of
disclosure to the clients of an introducing broker "Id. at 1295-96.
118 Blech II, 961 F Supp. at 582.
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Interpreted as the "Blech Exception,"119 the court held that
allegations of pressure exerted by a clearing firm to reduce the
introducing firm's debt balance, coupled with knowledge of
"sham trading" (at the introducing firm) and the clearance of
those trades, went beyond a clearing firm's routine clearing
functions and were sufficient to survive a motion to disnnss. 120
Thus, even when participating in the sale of securities in its
"traditional market role," a clearing firm may be held liable for
"imtiating," "directing," and "contriving" fraudulent trades.1 21
The court stated that this "case illustrates the fact-intensive
battle between litigants in clearing firm cases and [ably]
demonstrates that clearing firms are not always immune from
liability exposure."122
Because aiding and abetting claims under Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act are restricted in private suits, the court's
discussion focused on whether the acts of the clearing firm,
Bear Stearns, were "more than aiding and abetting" and
therefore constituted primary liability 123 Reiterating the
prevailing standard, the court stated that even with knowledge
of the fraud, "conduct that is no more than the performance
of routine clearing functions" cannot constitute primary
liability;124 therefore, "the act of clearing sham trades is not
equivalent to causing or directing sham trades. "125 Such
conduct, stated the court, amounts to "no more than a non-
existent claim of aiding and abetting" under Central Bank. 26
Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiffs alleged
sufficient facts to establish the requisite elements of scienter
and direct participation that are required to state a claim for
primary liability against the defendant, Bear Stearns. 27
Through knowledgeable participation "at both the initiation
and clearing stages" of several fraudulent transactions, Bear
119 Scone Invs. v. Am. Third Mkt. Corp., No. 97 CIV 3802, 1998 WL 205338
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998).12 0 Blech li, 961 F. Supp. at 584.
12 1 See Scone InVs., 1998 WL 205338, at *8.
122 Ylne & Moss, supra note 6, at 145.
123 Blech 1, 961 F. Supp. at 583.
124 Id. at 584.
125 Id.126 Id.
127 Id.
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Stearns was held to be a direct participator in the fraud.128
Recogmzing a difference between clearing cash and margin
trades, the court stated that Bear Stearns had the power to
"deny or extend margin credit" to the introducing broker, and
thereby used its power to influence fraudulent activity 129 "[B]y
demanding that Blech reduce its debit balance with knowledge
of Blech's history of sham trading," Bear Stearns directed
certain fraudulent transactions by Blech.130
This course of conduct by Bear Stearns-the instigation of trading
that Bear Stearns knew or should have known would result in
fraudulent trades that would artificially inflate the price of Blech
securities, and the subsequent clearing of the resultant fraudulent
trades for its own pecuniary benefit-constitutes an attempt to
affect the price of Blech securities The pressure exerted by Bear
Stearns on Blech to reduce his debit balance, when combined with
Bear Stearns' knowledge of Blech's sham trading and its clearing of
such trades, does not reflect the standard practice of [a] clearing
broker. 1
3 1
The court concluded the "complaint crosse[d] the line dividing
secondary liability from primary liability when it claim[ed]
that Bear Stearns 'directed' or 'contrived' certain allegedly
fraudulent trades."132
Presumably altering previous case law, the court
distinguished the conduct of a normal clearing broker
extending loans on margin with the conduct of a broker who,
with knowledge of past sham trading, extends loans on
margin. 13 Therefore, the court implies that clearing trades on
margin, with knowledge of past sham trading at the
introducing firm, will alter the characterization of the clearing
function-causing it to become no longer routine. 13 4 As a
financial lender, the clearing broker has a vested interest in
the financial stability of the introducing firm, and in order to
128 Blech II, 961 F Supp. at 585.
129 Id. at 583.
130 Id. at 584.
131 Id. at 584-85.
132 Id. at 584.
133 Blech II, 961 F Supp. at 585 C'These allegations stand on grounds
different from those presented in Ross v. Bolton [where] plaintiffs only alleg[ed] the
conduct of a normal clearing broker that extends loans on margin to its clients.").
134 Id. at 585.
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decrease its own risk, Bear Stearns was motivated to maintain
the price of Blech securities because those securities were
collateral for margin loans extended to Blech. 13 5 It is this
pressure exerted by the clearing firm, their instigation of
trades, and their knowledge of sham trading which
distinguishes fraudulent conduct from the normal functions of
a clearing broker extending loans on margin.
In subsequent cases, Blech II has been interpreted
narrowly In Scone Investments v. American Thrd Market
Corp., plaintiff, Scone Investments, alleged that the defendant,
Standard Bank Investment Corp. (Jersey) Ltd. ("Standard
Bank" or "Bank"), directed a market mampulation scheme
aimed at artfficially inflating the price of securities. 13 6 Similar
to the complaint in Blech I1, the plaintiff alleged that Standard
Bank directed the liquidation of certain securities in order to
reduce the defendant's credit line and corresponding risk of
default. Despite these similar allegations, the court failed to
find Standard Bank primarily liable. Although it was alleged
that Standard Bank directed the sale of securities, it was not
alleged that the "sale be effectuated by way of fraudulent
misrepresentation."'137 The court found that "[t]he Bank's
liquidation demand is a far cry from the 'intimate' 'hands-on
involvement' and participation in 'key decisions' about the
details of the sale which would render it a primary violator."138
The court held that Standard Bank's initial financing of the
purchase of the securities at issue and the subsequent release
of those securities from inventory for trading was indirect and
"amount[ed] to nothing more than the routine functioning of a
lending institution."139 Although Standard Bank may have
initiated the sale of securities by demanding that defendants
reduce its credit line, the court held that it did not directly
participate in the execution of the fraudulent transaction, and
thus cannot be held primarily liable. 140 Standard Bank's
135 1d. at 583.
136 Scone Invs., 1998 WL 205338, at *1.
137 Id. at *8.
138 Id. (citing SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1460-61 (2d Cir.
1996)). 139 Id. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
140 Scone InVs., 1998 WL 205338, at *9.
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alleged participation may be characterized as indirect and
liability for such acts would constitute aiding and abetting
liability, a claim which no longer exists for private plaintiffs
after Central Bank.
In Goldberger v. Bear Stearns & Co., a class action suit,
the plaintiff class alleged that the clearing firm knowingly
participated in the manipulation of the price of stocks. 141
Distinguishing the allegations sustained in Blech It, the court
dismissed the claims since there were no allegations that the
clearing firm
instigated trading that it "knew or should have known would result
m fraudulent trades that would artificially inflate the price" of
mampulated securities. Nor are there allegations that Bear Stearns
"asserted control over trading operations by placing Bear Stearns'
employees at offices to observe trading activities, approving or
declining to execute trades, imposing restrictions on inventory, and
loaning funds."142
Therefore, absent a clearing firm's knowledge that the
securities involved were being manipulated and direct control
over those securities, the "Blech exception" will not apply
D Violatins of the Rules of Self-Regulatory Organizatins
Through their rule making responsibilities, self-
regulatory organizations play a fundamental role in the
development of the law governing the clearing relationslp.
Most importantly, SRO rules dictate the terms of the carrying
agreement between the introducing firm and clearing firm. A
clearing firm could have supervisory responsibilities over the
introducing firm if such terms were mandated by a SRO rule
and inserted in the clearing arrangement. If the clearing firm
did not fulfill those supervisory responsibilities in limited
circumstances, a violation of a SRO rule could create a cause of
action under the federal securities laws. Currently, there is a
141 Goldberger v. Bear Stearns & Co., No. 98 CIV 8677, 2000 WL
1886605 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2000).
'
4 2 Id. at *5.
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split among the federal courts as to whether a violation of a
SRO rule creates a federal cause of action.1 43
In 1969, representing the minority view, Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith was the first case to find
a private federal cause of action for the violation of NYSE Rule
405-the "know your customer" rule144 -requiring "every
member firm [to] [u]se due diligence to learn the essential
facts relative to every customer, order, cash or margin account
"145 Defendants, who were acting in a manner typically
143 Compare Cook v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 726 F Supp. 151, 156 (S.D. Tex.
1989) (holding that a private cause of action exists for violations of NYSE rule 405);
Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding
that a private cause of action exists for violations of the "know your customer' rule),
aff'd tn part, remanded on other grounds, 579 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); and Faturik, 442
F Supp. at 946 (holding that a NYSE Rule 405 violation can create a private claim for
relief in some circumstances); with VeriFone Secs. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that a private cause of action does not exit for a violation of the NYSE
rule); Craighead v. E.F Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of action); Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a
private federal cause of action); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 680 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of
action); Birotte v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 468 F Supp. 1172, 1180
(D.N.J. 1979) (holding that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of
action); and Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F Supp. 292, 297 (S.D. Iowa
1975) (holding that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of action).
144 'YKnow Your Customer," supra note 2, at 493; NYSE Rules 405 and 382
were amended in 1982 to allow clearing firms to shift the burden of the "know your
customer" rule to the introducing broker. As a result of these amendments, clearing
firms maintain that they are no longer liable for the failure to investigate or inquire
into the acts of the introducing firm which may be fraudulent. Aidikoff et al., supra
note 3, at 122.
145 New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 provides the following:
Every member organization is required through a general partner or
an officer who is a holder of voting stock to (1) Use due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every
cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and
every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or
carried by such organization. (2) Supervise diligently all accounts
handled by registered representatives of the organization. (3)
Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly
after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a
customer, provided, however, that in the case of branch offices, the
opening of an account for a customer may be approved by the manager
of such branch office but the action of such branch office manager
shall within a reasonable time be approved by a general partner or an
officer who is a holder of voting stock in the organization. The
member, general partner or officer approving the opening of the
account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally informed as
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assigned to clearing brokers, and who knew or should have
known that the brokers for whom they were executing trades
were converting their customer's property, were held to have
shown a "callous disregard" for the "know your customer"
rule.146 In determining whether to permit a suit for the
violation of an Exchange rule, the court considered the "nature
of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme,
with the party urging the implication of a federal liability
carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than
when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation."147
The court held that violation of Rule 405 was actionable since
the rule is integral to the SEC's regulation of Exchanges and
was designed for the protection of investors. 1
Although Buttrey did not hold that a violation of Rule
405 was per se actionable, subsequent violations of the "know
your customer" rule were "recognized judicially only in factual
situations where a broker's failure to investigate a customer
[was] tantamount to actual fraud or reckless indifference."'149 A
second action for violation of NYSE Rule 405 was sustained in
1977 in Faturik v. Woodmere.150 The court held that defendant
Bear Stearns had a duty to inquire into their customers'
situation under Rule 405 since the complaint alleged
"irregularities or suspicious circumstances putting Bear
Stearns on notice" of possible fraudulent activity 151 However,
absent "irregularity or suspicious circumstances," the court
held that a clearing broker had "no duty to look beyond its
primary customer ",152
to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature of the
proposed account and shall indicate his approval in writing on a
document which is a part of the permanent records of his office or
organization.
Id.
146 Buttrey, 410 F.2d at 141. See also Hawkins v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Beane, 85 F Supp. 104, 122-24 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
147 Buttrey, 410 F.2d at 142 (citing Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966)).148 Id.
149 '"now Your Customer," supra note 2, at 493.
150 442 F Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
151 Id.152 Id. at 946.
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Since the 1970s, the rules governing the clearing
relationship have undergone two revisions. First, in 1982, the
clearing industry lobbied for reform of regulatory rules
governing carrying agreements and the NYSE amended Rules
382 and 405, both governing carrying agreements. 153 The 1982
amendments allow the clearing firm to shift any and all
liability to the introducing firm and to "shift the burden of the
'know your customer rule' to their introducing counterpart."154
The SEC noted that the proposed amendments are aimed to
"clarify the relationship and responsibilities" between the
clearing and introducing firms "while also recognizing the
nature of the contractual relationship" between the parties. 155
Following the 1982 amendments, courts have used the
contractual agreement as a shield against liability 156
Since then, however, as the number of introducing firms
have steadily increased, the resources needed to monitor and
regulate those firms have "stretched thin."15 7  Recent
amendments have been aimed at improving the monitoring
efforts at both introducing and clearing firms. These
amendments were part of a reaction to a rise in questionable,
and potentially fraudulent, activity on the part of introducing
firms. 15 8
In 1999, the SEC approved amendments to NYSE Rule
382 and NASD Rule 3230.159 The amendments address the
handling of customer complaints, 160 specific procedures for
issuing "exception-type reports,"161 and procedures involving an
introducing firm's ability to issue negotiable documents (e.g.,
153 The SEC approved amendments to NYSE Rules 382 and 405 on February
19, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. at 18,497.
154 Aidikoffet al., supra note 3, at 122.
155 59 Fed. Reg. 33,517.156 See Stander v. Fin. Clearing & Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
157 See Minnerop supra note 2, at 850.
158 See Self-Regulatory Org.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
and Amendment No. 1 by the Nal Assoc. of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Amend its Rule
3230 Relating to Clearing Agreements, Exchange Release No. 39,349, 62 Fed. Reg.
63,589, 63,590 (Dec. 1, 1997) [hereinafter NASD Rule Amendments].
159 NASD Rule Amendments, supra note 157; See also NYSE 1999
Amendments, supra note 11. The NYSE and NASD amendments mirror one another.
160 NYSE Rule 382(d); NASD Rule 3230(b).
161 NYSE Rule 382(e); NASD Rule 3230(c). Exception reports help introducing
firms maintain supervisory responsibilities. See NASD Rule Amendments, supra note
157, at 63,591.
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checks) on their clearing firm's account. 16 2 These amendments
are intended to "enhance [an] introducing organization's ability
to supervise activities relating to customer accounts" and to
"enhance the ability of the Exchange and other securities self-
regulatory organizations to monitor the activities of
introducing organizations and their compliance with applicable
regulatory requirements." 6 3
The change most relevant to liability issues involves an
increase in monitoring and reporting of customer complaints. 164
NYSE Rule 382(d) and NASD Rule 3230(b) require the
carrying firm to promptly furnish any written customer
complaint to the introducing firm and to the introducing firm's
Designated Examining Authority ("DEA"). 6 5 Once complaints
are collected, it is the DEA who processes the information and
provides the introducing firm with information about a
particular complaint or group of complaints i6 Presumably, a
clearing firm could be held liable for the failure to comply with
this independent duty to act.
After a customer complaint is received, the amended
rules require the clearing firm to provide acknowledgment to
the customer of its receipt and to inform the customer that the
complaint has been forwarded to the proper regulatory
organization in addition to the introducing firm. 167 Written
confirmation of the receipt of complaints serves to alert the
customer that the clearing firm, introducing broker, and proper
regulatory agency have all received and have been made aware
162 NYSE Rule 382(f); NASD Rule 3230(d).
163 Information Memo Number 99-33, Salvatore Pallante, NYSE Semor Vice
President, to all NYSE Members and Member Organizations, July 1, 1999, available at
http://www.nyse.com/content/memos/NT000392D6.html. (last visited Feb. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter NYSE Memo].164 Id. at 2.
165 NYSE 1999 Amendments, supra note 11.
166 See NASD Rule Amendments, supra note 157, at 63,591.
167 Amendment to Rule 382(d). This amendment was m response to
trends showing introducing firms' disregard for NASD Rule 3070, which requires
introducing members to report to the NASD "any written customer complaints against
it involving allegations of theft or misappropriation of funds or securities or of forgery."
Recognizing the reality of most situations involving fraud, the NASD admits that it
does not receive reports in a "timely manner' and is only aware of the customer
complaint "long after the fact." See NASD Rule Amendments, supra note 157, at
63,590.
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of the complaint.1 68 Additionally, the early collection of
complaints by a regulatory body may enhance an
organization's regulatory potential for quick action by
providing more information about possible fraudulent
behavior, at an earlier time. 16 9 For example, large numbers of
complaints regarding one introducing firm may be indicative of
a problem requiring prompt regulatory action. 70
The amendments also require the clearing firm to
provide the introducing firm with a comprehensive list of all
exception-type reports offered as part of its clearing services' 7 '
and to retain and preserve copies of reports requested by the
introducing orgamzation. 7 2 In a release, the SEC noted that
exception reports allow for early detection of problems or
suspicious activity within a firm's trading practices because
exception reports may be used to reveal "unusual account
activity or possible unauthorized trades."'7 3 The underlying
premise of the rule is that the issuance of exception reports
helps the introducing firm maintain its supervisory
responsibilities. 7 4
Under the amended rules, the clearing firm must
approve an introducing firm's "supervisory procedures"
regarding the issuance of negotiable instruments. 7 5 Although
the rule does not mandate what types of approval procedures
the clearing firm should assume, it implies that some kind of
contact with the customer may be necessary In the NYSE's
view the best supervisory practice would require all checks or
wires to be accompanied by a notarized letter from the
customer authorizing the money transfer. 76  The SEC
believes that these new provisions will require the clearing
firm to "reexamine its relationship with the introducing firm" if
the introducing firm does not have adequate safeguards in
place. 77
168 Id. at 63,591.
169 Id. at 63,590.
170 Id.
171 NYSE Rule 382(e); NASD Rule 3230(c).
172 NYSE Rule 382(e)(i).
173 NYSE 1999 Amendments, supra note 11, at 5.
174 NASD Rule Amendments, supra note 157, at 63,591.
175 NYSE Rule 382(f); NASD Rule 3230(d).
176 NYSE Memo, supra note 163 (emphasis added).
177 NYSE 1999 Amendments, supra note 11, at 5.
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III. THE BEAR STEARNS SETTLEMENT
On August 5, 1999, the SEC settled with Bear Stearns
in connection with the company's clearing relationship with the
now defunct introducing firm A.R. Baron & Co. ("Baron"). The
SEC found that Bear Stearns directly caused a fraud on
Baron's customers and aided and abetted violations of the
Commission's net capital rules, the rules governing the
treatment of subscribers' funds in contingency offerings, and
the rules governing credit extensions and record keeping.178
According to the SEC, Bear Stearns' "conduct extended
well beyond these routine clearing functions, and included
approving and disapproving trades, providing working capital,
and at times, preventing Baron from rescinding certain
unauthorized trades."'179 Bear Stearns agreed to pay $5 million
in civil penalties as well as fund customer claims up to $30
million. 180 This case marks the first time the Commission has
found a clearing firm liable for fraud involving its introducing
counterpart'8 1 and shows that clearing firms are no longer
absolutely immune from liability
Until Baron's collapse, Bear Stearns continued to clear
trades for Baron, knowing that Baron was engaged in
securities violation, and offering significant assistance, that
sometimes even causes those violations. From its mception, the
value of Baron's house stock began to decline rapidly, which
immediately caused the value of Baron's inventory account
with Bear Stearns to decine-threatenig its ability to meet
industry wide net capital requirements, as well as Bear
Stearn's own individual requirements for Baron.182 In order to
maintain the price of its house stocks, Baron engaged in high
178 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14. Bear Stearns neither admitted nor
denied the findings of the order but consented to them solely for the purposes of the
SEC proceedings. Id. The settlement was precipitated by New York County District
Attorney Morgenthau's successful prosecution of the introducing firm. Bear Press
Release, supra note 14.
179 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 8.
180 Id.
181 Antifraud: Bear Stearns to Pay Another $3.5 Million to Reimburse Cheated
A.R. Baron Customers, SECURITIES LAW DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 21, 1999).
182 Adler Coleman, Baron's prior clearing agent, began selling significant
shares of Baron's house stock, exerting downward pressure on the price of these thinly
traded stocks. Id.
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pressure sales; readily recogmzable were
classic indications of unauthorized trading [such as] a high
incidence of failures to pay for trades, excessive trade cancellations,
corrections and credit extensions, numerous customer complaints
against Baron and a pattern of stock being sold to customers from
Baron's inventory and then purchased back into the inventory by
Baron close to the settlement at a loss. 183
As a result of these tactics, certain customers refused to pay for
unauthorized trades. Not surprisingly, additional Bear Stearns
staff was needed in order to handle the influx of customer
complaints. Also, not surprisingly, Bear Stearns continued to
defer all customer complaints back to Baron.
Beginning in September 1995, Bear Stearns intiated
several supervisory procedures to ensure the protection of its
credit position. Bear Stearns employees were assigned to
closely monitor Baron's daily trading activities, including
keeping a detailed log of trading patterns and determining
whether Baron complied with Bear Stearns's equity
requirements. 8 4 All inside trades were to be individually
approved by Bear Stearns representatives who were present on
Barons premises. Approval was conditioned on "whether the
trade increased Bear Stearns's credit exposure by making
Baron a net buyer of its house stocks on that day "85 If the
trade was approved, Bear Stearns still required that Baron
gain customer telephone verification through the use of a script
provided by Bear Stearns, with Bear Stearns employees
momtoring the conversation. 186
Although anticipated, Bear Stearns never officially
terminated its relationship with Baron. In October 1995, Bear
Stearns informed Baron that it planned to terminate their
clearing relationship "because the relationship had become too
expensive and risky for Bear Stearns."'1 7 Nevertheless, plans
to terminate fell through with Bear Stearns agreeing to loan
Baron additional funds in order to comply with NASD net
183 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 9.
184 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 9.
185 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 14.
186 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 14
187 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 14.
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capital requirements.1 8 8 Again in December 1995, Bear Stearns
notified Baron of its plan to terminate their clearing
relationship only to revoke its threat of termnation on March
16, 1996. On May 29, 1996, the SEC issued a temporary cease
and desist order against Baron. Yet, on June 14, 1996, Bear
Stearns again loaned Baron $1.5 million in funds in order to
meet NASD net capital requirements. On July 3, 1996, in an
effort to evade SEC orders, Baron filed for bankruptcy. Finally
on August 5, 1999, the SEC settled with Bear Stearns,
collecting $5 million in civil penalties and $30 million to fund
customer complaints.
The impact of the settlement on the future success of
claims against clearing firms is debatable. One commentator
has suggested that since the case was a SEC settlement, with
no adjudicated result, it holds little, if any precedential
value.18 9 In addition, the facts represent an atypical case in
which a high ranking executive at the clearing firm personally
benefitted and was intimately involved in the fraud.190
It is not a case centered on a theme that the cleanng firm turned a
blind eye to the known misconduct of one of its correspondents. Nor
is it a case where the clearing firm, as a corporate entity, "knew or
should have known" of the correspondents' misdeeds simply through
the firm's computer data and records. 191
However, these shortcomings may not prove dispositive.
It is high level executives who, acting on behalf of the corporate
entity, customarily expose the corporation to crininal and civil
liabilities. Moreover, the well publicized settlement sparked
renewed interest in the case for finding clearing firms liable for
investor losses, and, most importantly, spurred regulatory
attention to the issue of clearing firm liability
IV THEORIES OF LiABILITY
Over the past three decades, the courts and self-
regulatory orgamzations have struggled with the issue of
188 Bear Stearns Settlement, supra note 14, at 15.
189 Shannon, supra note 3, at 702.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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clearing firm liability, leaning toward liability in the early
1970s and away from that position beginning in 1982. As they
have done in the past, self-regulatory organizations may
change the rules governing the clearing arrangement, making
it easier or harder for the clearing firm to -escape liability 192
Note, here there is an opportunity for change; as a matter of
contract between the parties, the (contractual) allocation of
responsibilities may be altered through rules promulgated by
the self-regulatory organizations. 19 The 1999 amendments
were an attempt, although meager, to reassess and reformulate
existing liabilities. The interpretation of these amendments by
the courts and their affect on reducing securities fraud is yet to
be seen.
Nevertheless, as the presence of clearing firms within
the market strengthens, their lobbying efforts to curb any
expansion of the law will continue. As illustrated by the 1982
amendments to NYSE Rule 405, self-regulatory organizations
are "reluctant to promulgate rules for the protection of
investors if there will be a presumption of civil liability in the
event of their breach."194 Therefore, it is unlikely that self-
regulatory organizations will impose affirmative
responsibilities on clearing firms within the carrying
agreement absent external pressures. Future efforts to
influence the imposition of clearing firm liability may include
pressure from the SEC on self-regulatory organizations, such
as the NYSE and NASD, to amend their own rules governing
carrying agreements. Those organizations may also have their
own incentives to adopt stricter regulations which may
contribute to and improve the organizations' overall
institutional integrity In addition, the SEC may promulgate
its own rules. Finally, it is also up to the courts to reformulate
and restructure their thinking about the basic tenets of the
clearing process and the relationship that exists among the
introducing firm, clearing firm, and customer. As long as the
courts refuse to recognize any legal relationship between the
clearing firm and investor, the clearing firm will always escape
192 The SEC can require self-regulatory organizations to adopt such rules. See
Securities and Exchange Act, §19(c).
193 See POSER, supra note 1, at 81.
194 'Know Your Customer," supra note 2, at 561.
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liability under the premise that there exists no fiduciary duty
between the two parties.
A. Establishing a Fiduciary Relatinship Under Agency
Law
The fiduciary duty is fundamental when it comes to
protecting investors; it should be regulated, not contracted
away The fiduciary duty is necessary to ensure the
accountability of those who are in control. The need for
establishing fiduciary duties among business partners is
magmfied, especially in clearing situations, where one party,
the investor, has no real bargaining power over the terms of
the contract.
Nevertheless, in the clearing context, the implications of
finding a fiduciary duty should be limited. Liability should not
be imposed for the performance of routine clearing functions,
absent a clearing firm's knowledge of the fraud. Otherwise,
similar to respondeat superor liabilities under tort law,
liability would be inposed automatically upon the clearing
firm. That standard is too high. Under such high standards,
the clearing firm's role would be to "police" the actions of the
introducing firm, a position most parties do not want to invoke.
Overwhelmingly, courts have rejected the notion that
there is any fiduciary relationship between a clearing firm and
an investor.195 As such, the lack of a fiduciary duty has created
substantial roadblocks for imposing even minimal liability
upon the clearing firm. Absent a fiduciary duty, the clearing
firm has no duty to disclose knowledge of potential fraud.
Courts have recogmzed that the clearing firm acts as an agent
of the introducing firm, and that the introducing firm is the
agent of the customer, with both relationships invoking
fiduciary obligations.196 But the analysis has stopped there.
Therefore, this analysis implies that no, or at most a minimal,
195 Absent any fiduciary duty, the scienter requirement under § 10(b) is
heightened. Therefore, in the absence of any fiduciary duty, the clearing firm would not
be liable even if it knew of fraudulent activity on the part of the introducing firm. In
the absence of any fiduciary relationship, there is also no duty on the part of the
clearing firm to inquire into or disclose the actions of the introducing firm.
196 See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18.
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relationship exists between the clearing firm and the
customer.197
One reason that the courts have failed to find clearing
firms liable for investor losses is that they have confused the
relationship among the introducing firm, clearing firm, and
investor. The clearing firm not only maintains a relationslnp
with the introducing firm, it also maintains a relationship with
the customer. As such, under agency law, the clearing firm is
an agent to the introducing firm as well as a "subagent" to the
customer. 198 The subagent (clearing firm) is both the agent of
the principal (investor) and an agent of the appointing agent
(introducing firm). Therefore, a clearing broker's disavowal of
any responsibility (to the customer) or liability for the acts of
the introducing firm does not preclude an agency relationship.
A subagent is "a person appointed by an agent . to
perform functions undertaken by the agent for the principal,
but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the principal to be
primarily responsible." 199 The prefix "sub" is meant to indicate
that the party appointed to perform functions for the agent is
itself an agent of the appointing party; e.g., a clearing firm
(subagent), appointed to perform functions undertaken by an
introducing firm on behalf of a customer, is an agent of the
introducing firm (appointed party).200 Stated alternatively, the
subagent is the agent of the one from whom he derived his
authority 20'
In addition, the subagent is an agent of the principal.20 2
Accordingly, the clearing firm is the agent of the investor.
Recogmzing that the "purpose of the entire arrangement is to
carry out the purpose of the first principal" (the customer), the
Restatement on Agency establishes the relationship as follows.
The appointed party is the "agent of two principals, one of
whom is subordinate to another."20 3 Thus, the clearing firm is
197 Id. at 63.198 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 5.
199 Id. § 5, ch. 26.200 Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18, at 53.
201 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 5, ch. 1.
202 Id. § 5, chs. 1, 24.
203 Note the following illustration: A person employs a real estate broker to
sell a tract of land, with the understanding that the real estate broker is to use his own
instrumentalities, including subordinates who are to be responsible to the real estate
broker for what they do and who are to receive their compensation from hun. The
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the agent of both the introducing firm as well as the investor,
with the introducing firm subordinate to the investor.
Moreover, the clearing firm must be the agent of the investor
because the clearing firm binds the investor while acting on his
or her behalf.20 4 Finally, as an agent of the principal, the
clearing firm stands in a fiduciary relationship to the
principal.205
It is well established that agents owe fiduciary duties to
their principals. The same is true with subagents. Although
the subagent is not contractually liable to the principal because
the principal generally has a contract only with the agent, the
subagent shall be responsible for any violation of a fiduciary
duty 20 6 As the Restatement of Agency explains:
The subagent is subject to a duty, as is the agent, not to act contrary
to what he knows to be the principal's orders. Although he has a
duty of loyalty and obedience to the agent who is his immediate
principal, the subagent is subject to liability to the ultimate
principal for participating in a breach of duty by the agent to the
principal if he has notice that the agent's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty 207
Therefore, under agency law, the subagent (clearing firm) owes
fiduciary duties to the principal (customer) as well as the agent
(introducing firm).
Under the above analysis, as a fiduciary, a clearing firm
is subject to liability for participating in any breach of duty by
the introducing firm. If the clearing firm is on notice of
fraudulent activity by the introducing firm, then the clearing
firm will be subject to liability to the investor for participating
in the fraud. Presumably, any activity by the clearing firm
after having notice of fraud-e.g., continuing to clear trades or
broker's salesman is employed to execute a contract for the principal and is liable to
the broker for any failure of performance. Notwithstanding, the salesman thus
employed to sell Blackacre does so on behalf of the owner. If this were not true he could
not bind the seller. 'With reference to the owner, [the salesman] is as much an agent in
the transaction as if he had been employed directly "Id. § 5, ch.1 & § 428, ch. 13.
2 04 Id. § 5, ch. 1.
205 Id. § 5, cmt. d.
206 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 5, cmt. d; see also Licar v Blackwelder,
539 A.2d 609, 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (secondary broker "under the same duty as the
primary broker to act in the utmost of good faith").
207 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 428, ch. 13.
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offering additional credit-would be a breach of the clearing
firm's fiduciary duties. Additionally, as a fiduciary, a clearing
firm is subject to a duty to not act contrary to what he knows to
be the principal's orders. Therefore, a clearing firm would be
held to violate its fiduciary duties if it refused to accept or
recognize customer demands to stop or cancel unauthorized
trades.
The ramifications of finding a fiduciary relationship
between the clearing firm and investor are great. As a
fiduciary, a clearing firm would have a duty to disclose possible
fraud at the introducing firm. Moreover, if a fiduciary
relationship between the clearing firm and investor is found, a
recklessness standard will be enough to establish scienter.
Therefore, finding a fiduciary relationship would make it easier
for investors to bring complaints against clearing firms,
especially as primary violators.208
B. Knowledge of the Fraud
The 1999 amendments to NYSE and NASD rules and
recent legal decisions, namely Blech 1I, may make it more
difficult for clearing firms to claim ignorance of securities fraud
violations occurring at the introducing firm. The 1999
amendments require the clearing firm to acknowledge receipt
of customer complaints. 209 Customer complaints made directly
to the clearing firm regarding unauthorized trades may alert a
clearing firm to fraudulent activities occurring at the
introducing firm. Presumably, a clearing firm who receives
written customer complaints cannot deny actual notice.210 Even
if the clearing firm does not have actual knowledge of fraud,
208 Presumably, liability based on agency principles has not been singled out
by Central Bank. See Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 CIV 5788, 1995 WL
261518 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995) (holding that liability based on agency principles is not
limited by Central Bank). See also AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42
F.3d 1421, 1432 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that "Central Bank's discussion of aiding and
abetting should not be transplanted into the more settled realm of agency law"); Seolas
v. Bilzeran, 951 F. Supp. 978, 983 (D. Utah 1997) (holding that even though Rule 10b-
5 "does not specifically mention agency or respondeat superior," these claims are not
precluded under Central Bank).209 Aidikoffet al., supra note 3, at 132.
210 Id.
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adequate suspicion that the introducing firm is partaking in
manipulative schemes to defraud investors may be inferred.
When monitoring margin trading, a clearing firm may
also have sufficient insight and knowledge into possible
fraudulent schemes originating at the introducing firm. When
monitoring margin accounts, the clearing firm focuses on the
amount of equity in the clearing firm's account.211 "[The
carrying firm is particularly concerned with the credit
worthiness of the introducing firm and its customers and will
monitor closely potential credit exposure for its own
protection."212 It is these safeguards which may lead the
clearing firm to uncover fraudulent practices at the introducing
firm.
C. Participation
Liability is not imposed for performing routine clearing
functions. 213 The traditional legal standard has been that a
clearing firm will not be held liable for the fraudulent acts of
the introducing firm unless it actively and knowingly
participates in the fraud. Therefore, neither the inadvertent,
nor purposeful clearing of fraudulent trades are actionable
against the clearing firm. The underlying rationales are that
clearing is purely an administrative, routine, and neutral
activity and that knowledge of the fraud does not taint the
action. Moreover, this theory assumes that when clearing sham
transactions, the actions of a clearing broker are no different
than when the broker clears legitimate transactions.
211 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 845.
212 Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18, at 49.
213 Blech II, 961 F Supp. at 584
When plaintiffs allege mere clearing conduct against Bear Stearns,
such allegations amount to no more than a non existent claim of aiding
and abetting because, at most, they allege only that Bear Stearns
knowingly and substantially assisted Blech by clearing the fraudulent
trades. However, the complaint crosses the line dividing secondary
liability from primary liability when it claims that Bear Stearns
"directed" or "contrived" certain allegedly fraudulent trades.
[Vol. 67: 2
CLEARING FIRM LIABILITY
Moreover, even if a fiduciary relationslp exists
between the clearing firm and the investor, routine clearing,
without knowledge of the fraud, should not be actionable
against the clearing firm.214 Imposing liability for the
performance of routine clearing functions would mean that
clearing firms would always be exposed to liability by virtue of
their relationship with a defunct broker dealer. Such a
standard would be too high; clearing firms would be required to
police the functions of the introducing firm.
Until Blech 11, the court had not defined what actions
extend beyond mere clearing services. In Blech II, the court
held that pressure exerted by a clearing firm to reduce the
introducing firm's debt balance, coupled with knowledge of
sham transactions (at the introducing firm) and the clearance
of those trades, went beyond routine clearing functions.215 It is
suggested by the Blech H court that when a clearing firm has
knowledge of fraud, its services extend beyond mere clearing.
Therefore, future theories of liability will depend on the
characterization of knowledge as a taint.
Clearing functions, that provide the clearing firm with
insight into suspicious or fraudulent activity at the introducing
firm should be considered participation. Inaction (including a
lack of inquiry or disclosure of possible fraud at the introducing
firm) in the face of knowledge should also be considered
participation. The assumption underlying this theory of
interdependence is that the inadvertent clearing of fraudulent
trades is no different than the purposeful clearing of
fraudulent trades. The axiom that the clearance of sham
transactions plays no part in the furtherance of fraud is false
and should be dismantled.
When performing clearing services with knowledge of
fraudulent activity, especially when clearing trades on margin,
the actions of the clearing firm should be distinguished from
those actions needed to clear legitimate trades. When acting as
a creditor, the clearing firm obligates itself to pay for all
executed trades regardless of any default on the part of the
214 Id. ('ven assuming that Bear Stearns had knowledge of the Blech
scheme, primary liability cannot attach when the fraudulent conduct that is alleged is
no more than the performance of routine clearing functions.").
215 Id.
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customer.216 Although, pursuant to the clearing agreement, the
introducing firm agrees to indemnify the clearing firm against
any loss due to a customer lack of funds, that is not always the
case. When the introducing firm can no longer carry the
burden or becomes insolvent, it is the clearing firm that
ultimately absorbs most, if not all, of the financial loss. 217
Therefore, the clearing firm is on high alert for any activity by
the introducing firm that will expose the clearing firm
financially 218 As evidenced by the A.R. Baron case, the clearing
firm knows that it cannot rely on the introducing broker to be
financially responsible or solvent.
As affirmed in Blech 1, when acting as creditor to the
introducing firm, clearing calls for the close momtoring of
introducing firms.219 "[C]learing firms momtor the introducing
firm's proprietary margin accounts, focusing on the market
value of those accounts and the liquidity and concentration of
securities in such accounts."220 To protect against such risk,
clearing firms have veto power over the execution of any trade
and may reject the introduction of new accounts. 221 In the past,
some clearing firms have even terminated agreements with an
introducing firm because of suspicious activity
When clearing margin trades with knowledge of
fraudulent trading at the introducing firm, the clearing broker
cannot be said to be a neutral or disinterested party and any
inaction on the part of the clearing broker should be actionable
by the aggrieved customer. In the face of knowledge of
fraudulent activity occurring at the introducing firm, the
clearing firm may be seen as an active participator in the
fraud. Clearing firms should have the affirmative duty to react
to customer complaints, to disclose possible fraudulent activity
at the introducing firm, to investigate or reverse questionable
trades, and even to terminate relations with fraudulent
introducing brokers.
21 6 finnerop, supra note 2, at 844.
217 Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 18, at n.15 C'[Considermg [the
introducing firm's] small net capital there was a substantial likelihood that the
clearing brokers would themselves have to bear all or part of any potential losses.").218 Id.
219 Minnerop, supra note 2, at 844.
220 Id. at 845.
221 Id.
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D. Crthque of Regulatory Changes
The 1999 amendments to the rules of self-regulatory
orgamzations attempt to address sales practice related
problems. The rules are pro-active and are meant to reveal "red
flags" prior to the time when full-blown fraud becomes
apparent. They may even cause clearing firms to act with a
greater degree of care when entering into clearing
relationships. The amendments are not, however, meant to
"alter the fundamental clearing relationship"222 and do not
"change or otherwise affect rights, responsibilities, or
liabilities of the introducing or clearing firm under law or
contract."223 Instead, they are simply meant to "clarify the
relationship and responsibilities" between the introducing and
clearing firms as outlined in the carrying agreement.224 The
amended rules reinforce well-established legal precedent that
all regulatory responsibility and corresponding liability lies
with the introducing firm rather than the carrying firm-with
the carrying firm acting as a blind intermediary
A fundamental effect of the amendments is that they
impose on the clearing firm an independent duty to act. As
such, investors may bring novel claims for violations of the
amended rules, e.g., failure by a clearing firm to alert the
proper SRO of a written customer complaint, or disregard of its
responsibilities for ensuring adequate supervisory procedures
at the introducing firm.225 It is too early to know how the courts
will interpret these new amendments or whether they will echo
early cases in which clearing firms were held liable for
violations of NYSE Rule 405, the "know your customer" rule.
Admittedly, the rules will increase the potential of self-
regulatory organizations to inhibit securities fraud, albeit in a
untimely and inefficient manner. The introducing broker is
probably the first person to whom a customer directs a
complaint. After receiving from an introducing firm an
unsatisfactory response, or no response, the customer's next
222 NYSE Memo, supra note 163, at 4; NASD Rule Amendments, supra note
158, at 63,590.223 NASD Rule Amendments, supra note 158, at 63,590.
224 NYSE Memo, supra note 163, at 4.
225 Kline & Moss, supra note 6, at 156.
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alternative is to contact the clearing firm. But the clearing
firm, pursuant to its interpretation of its responsibilities under
the carrying agreement, defers all complaints back to the
introducing firm! Thus, it may be said that the customer gets
the "run around."
The new amendments also require the clearing firm to
send all written complaints to the proper DEA and SRO.
However, reaction by self-regulatory agencies may occur long
after the completion of questionable trades. The reactions of
self-regulatory agencies usually occur on a large scale,
ultimately identfying magnificent fraud occurring over a long
period of time at a particular introducing firm. For the
disgruntled investor, re-action by the self regulatory agency
comes too late; investor funds have already been lost,
fraudulently transferred, or absconded to offshore entities-
ever to be found or retrieved.
Finally, the amendments do little more than facilitate
the retrieval and collection of customer complaints. Ironically,
the clearing firm is not required to act substantively, rather
only to act admninstratively; the rule does not require any
action on the part of the clearing firm to prevent fraudulent
transactions. The clearing firm is neither required to inquire
into nor examine customer complaints. At least one
commentator has hypothesized that "the amendments have
arguably provided the clearing firm with a more secure safe
harbor against many of the claims typically asserted against
them by customers of their introducing firms" 226 by allowing
clearing firms to wipe their hands clean of any responsibilities
early on in the regulatory process.
It is the clearing firm that has the best ability to curb
the fraud. By refusing either to clear-or by "canceling-a
fraudulent trade, the clearing firm has the potential to stop
fraud prior to or quickly after a trade is executed. Clearing
firms should have the affirmative duty to react to customer
complaints, to disclose possible fraudulent activity at the
introducing firm, and even to investigate or reverse
226 Shannon, supra note 3, at 682. The author argues that the new
amendments are "hardly a lip service to the problem. Rather, they are a well -balanced
and focused solution to the troublesome core questions of the responsibilities of
clearing firms and the need for action against misbehaving or fraudulent introducing
brokers." Id. at 709.
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questionable trades. Instead, read in conjunction with
amendments to NYSE Rule 405 ("know your customer" rule),
the new amendments can be interpreted as serving the resolve
of clearing firms to avoid any liability pertaining to fraudulent
transactions in association with the introducing firm.
CONCLUSION
The idea of holding a clearing firm liable for the acts of
an introducing firm with whom it contracts goes against the
gram of traditional practice within the securities industry
Clearing firms argue that requiring them to momtor the acts of
introducing brokers would result in increased compliance and
cost burdens. Ultimately, it is argued that the imposition of
liability will discourage clearing firms from entering into
clearing relationships, or even from renewing existing
relationships, with smaller introducing brokers. Some
commentators have even claimed that "the system [would] not
work if clearing firms are held liable for the sales practice
violations of introducing firms. ' 227 Commentators argue that
liability for "basic housekeeping functions" will expose the
clearing brokers to even greater risks.228 From the perspective
of the clearing firm, the risk may simply be too high: "Well-
capitalized clearing firms like Bear Stearns would be very
reluctant, indeed probably unwilling, to enter into clearing
agreements with relatively low-capitalized introducing firms;
that's the way the economics of the business work."229
These can all be seen as self-serving statements by the
clearing front. It is this increased responsibility and
corresponding risk that would cause clearing brokers to be
more discriminating when choosing to contract with small,
thinly capitalized introducing firms. If liability is imposed, the
degree of care taken by the clearing firm would be
substantially heightened-both when clearing for an
introducing firm with whom it has already contracted and
227 Wells Submisson, supra note 30, at 17.
228 Henriques & Truell, supra note 17, at Dl.
229 d. (quoting General Counsel and Executive Vice President for Bear
Stearns, Mark Lehman: "If they make the clearing firms liable for the sales-practice
activities of the introducing firms, they can't pay clearing broker's enough to accept
that risk.").
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when deciding to enter into new clearing relationships. In
addition, the higher the risk the introducing firm poses to the
clearing firm, the more expensive it will be for the introducing
firm to contract for services, thereby reducing the number of
small introducing firms who may be more susceptible to
engaging in fraudulent practices.
When clearing for introducing firms that have prior
reported dealings involving fraud, clearing firms impose higher
risks on themselves. Although clearing firms are aware of the
increased risk, they reject the duty and liability that flow from
it; they contract that duty away, and with it, accountability It
is the clearing firm that agrees to contract with and perform
clearing services for an introducing firm that may not adhere
to industry standards. It logically follows that with increased
risk comes increased responsibility When contracting with an
introducing firm that has repeatedly failed to meet margin
requirements, or has been known to be associated with past
fraudulent persons or practices, or has been repeatedly
reported by customer complaints, the pattern is all too clear.
The clearing firm should certainly be held responsible, and,
therefore, liable for directing, causing, or perpetuating
fraudulent activity and for failing to disclose or investigate
activity which has the potential to be fraudulent.
A clearing firm is one of the limited number of parties
who are privy to information about the financial situation of
the introducing firm. It is simply not true, as some
commentators argue, that the clearing of sham transactions is
no different than the clearing of legitimate transactions when
the clearing firm is aware of or suspects potential fraud at the
introducing firm. Moreover, because the clearing firm is
exposed to high risk, it is naive to claim that the clearing firm
is a detached and disinterested party Although it is sometimes
economically beneficial to turn a blind eye to short term
market manipulation, it is inappropriate not to require
affirmative action by the clearing firm to react to customer
complaints, investigate or reverse questionable trades, disclose
possible fraudulent activity at the introducing firm, and even
terminate contractual relations with fraudulent introducing
brokers.
In the past, the courts have improperly analyzed the
role of clearing firms when performing these functions.
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Clearing firms have the capacity to know when alleged
fraudulent practices are occurring at the introducing firm. And
knowledge of the fraud, coupled with a special duty to the
customer, imposes on the clearing firm liability for any lack of
disclosure. Therefore, non-neutral acts may impose on clearing
firms heightened levels of responsibility and, ultimately, yield
clearing firm liability.
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